This paper develops a general equilibrium model with equilibrium unemployment and noncooperative wage determination to analyze the importance of incomplete markets when risk-averse agents are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks. A version of the model calibrated to the U.S. economy shows that market incompleteness a¤ects individual behavior and aggregate conditions. An important mechanism at work is the joint in ‡uence of imperfect insurance and risk aversion in the wage bargaining. In comparison with the complete insurance benchmark, the introduction of idiosyncratic risk reduces wages, increases vacancies and reduces unemployment. Welfare analysis shows that while with complete markets it is optimal not to provide any unemployment insurance, with incomplete markets the optimal level is positive. Solving this model is particularly challenging because ex-ante homogeneous households accumulate di¤erent levels of wealth due to di¤erent employment histories. The paper proposes and implements a novel solution based on perturbation methods.
Introduction
The search and matching model of the labor market has been widely used in macroeconomics to explain the determination of unemployment. The key assumption of the model is that agents need to spend resources to form a successful employment match and engage in a productive activity. This realistic conjecture about the labor market has also been incorporated in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to analyze the e¤ects of macroeconomic shocks on labor market ‡ows. However, due to technical di¢ culties, most studies lack a treatment of the risks associated with income variation due to the presence of unemployment. These general equilibrium models usually assume that agents are either risk neutral or that they are perfectly insured against income ‡uctuations.
Paradoxically, a model devised to explain the existence of unemployment leaves aside what is arguably the most important concern derived from it. This omission is especially critical if we wish
to use such models to analyze the consequences of unemployment insurance.
Indeed, several empirical studies show that households are not perfectly insured and that this could be of particular importance in the presence of unemployment. For instance, Dynarski, Gruber, Mo¢ tt, and Burtless (1997) …nd that the ability of a household to smooth consumption across employment states is related to its wealth level; the decline in earnings for those households in the lower end of the wealth distribution has a stronger negative e¤ect on consumption expenditure. Gruber (2000) also shows that accumulated wealth and unemployment bene…ts are used as consumption-smoothing devices.
This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium unemployment with incomplete markets. Riskaverse agents search for jobs in the labor market and face idiosyncratic employment shocks. It studies the characteristics of the stationary equilibrium and the optimal level of unemployment insurance under this assumption. To achieve this, the paper develops a novel approach for solving for the aggregate dynamics in the presence of heterogeneity resulting from di¤erent labor market outcomes.
We characterize optimal agent behavior using a general equilibrium model with frictions in the labor market. The model consists of many risk-averse utility-maximizing consumers, and riskneutral pro…t-maximizing …rms that trade in the markets for goods and factors of production.
The presence of frictions in the labor market explains the existence of equilibrium unemployment.
Consumers randomly become unemployed during certain periods of their life. Since they are risk averse, they would like to insure against these risks. In the tradition of Bewley (1977 , 1980 ), Huggett (1993 and Aiyagari (1994) , we assume that they do not have su¢ cient …nancial instruments to successfully diversify the risks associated with random spells of unemployment. Consequently, exante homogeneous consumers accumulate di¤erent levels of wealth ex-post due to their dissimilar employment histories.
Since it is costly to hire a worker, there is a rent associated with any established productive job. We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and most related literature, in assuming that the wage is determined by a bargain between …rms and workers over this surplus. What is novel about our analysis is that we consider the e¤ect of idiosyncratic risks on the bargaining process. In the wage negotiations, agents compare what is o¤ered with their outside options. In the presence of incomplete markets, the amount of wealth that they have accumulated to be able to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature becomes relevant. The outside options are di¤erent for each agent. This contrasts with the bargaining under perfect income insurance where everyone enjoys the same outside option.
Solving a model with an endogenous wealth distribution is a di¢ cult task. We develop and implement a novel solution based on perturbation methods. The logic of these methods is to …rst solve the model for a particular case-which has a known, maybe analytical, solution-and then use the information obtained from that particular solution to …nd an approximation to the model's general solution. Translated to our speci…c framework, the objective is to …nd a particular solution to a case with a degenerate wealth distribution, in which all agents have the same accumulated wealth, and then use this solution to approximate the general solution to the model with a nondegenerate wealth distribution.
The existence of unemployment generates two obstacles to applying this kind of methodology.
First, unemployment is a discrete state: in any period of time, agents can be either employed or unemployed. Since perturbation methods rely on di¤erentiability of the model equilibrium conditions, the existence of a discrete variable makes their application di¢ cult. Second, in our model a degenerate distribution can only be achieved in equilibrium if all agents make the same consumption and saving decisions and hold the same amount of wealth. In other words, for such a distribution to exist in equilibrium all agents must be not only ex-ante, but also ex-post, homogeneous. But this situation will not obtain in the presence of unemployment, which creates di¤erences in income that unevenly a¤ect agents decisions, and ultimately over time, their accumulated wealth.
We tackle these problems simultaneously. By allowing the turnover rate between employment statuses to vary with the length of the considered time period, we achieve a degenerate wealth distribution in the limit as the intervals are made in…nitely small. In our model, as we shrink the length of the period, the speed at which agents change employment status increases, and the mean duration of the time spent in each state decreases. In this fast-turnover limit, agents change their status in…nitely fast, and consequently over a given unit of time they all share the same income from labor. Since all agents have the same budget constraint, they become ex-post homogeneous. Consequently, this particular limit can be solved as if it where a representative agent model. To approximate the general solution to the heterogeneous agent model, we perturb the equilibrium conditions for the case of a small time interval in which agents spend a …nite amount of time in each employment status. Under these conditions, their budget constraints are no longer identical, and consequently they accumulate di¤erent amounts of wealth, thereby introducing expost heterogeneity. 1 A couple of remarks regarding our methodology are in order here. First, the equilibrium conditions characterizing our fast-turnover limit are comparable to those obtained under the assumption that agents share the same budget constraint because there exists some mechanism through which they pool their income. The di¤erence is that when we depart from that limit, we are able to characterize individual decisions and aggregate conditions in the absence of insurance markets.
This permits isolating the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk. Second, in approaching the fast-turnover limit, we do not approach the continuous-time Mortensen-Pissarides model. In their model, the probabilities of changing employment status are given by a Poisson process, so that there is a …xed probability of a transition over any …nite time interval. Consequently, the heterogeneity does not disappear in their continuous-time limit. Our assumption about transition probabilities instead delivers identical incomes from labor for all agents in the limit.
The results show that the lack of complete insurance has noticeable e¤ects on agents' optimal decisions and on aggregate conditions. Compared to the perfect-insurance benchmark, the introduction of uninsurable income risk reduces consumption upon becoming unemployed. It is worth noting that we obtain these results in a model lacking a consumption-leisure trade-o¤ or home production, 2 so that all consumption changes can be attributed to insu¢ cient insurance. It also follows that di¤erences in consumption are immediately translated into di¤erences in welfare.
We observe that welfare depends positively on individual assets but, ceteris paribus, welfare of unemployed agents is lower than that of the employed.
An important mechanism in our framework that has not been analyzed in previous work is the e¤ect of incomplete insurance on the wage bargain. Agents holding di¤erent levels of accumulated wealth will have di¤erent outside options. Consequently, there is a direct e¤ect on prices derived from heterogeneity: aggregate wages decline as a result of idiosyncratic risk. For comparison, consider a perfectly competitive market for labor. In this case, even if agents are heterogeneous and the wealth distribution may a¤ect their optimal decisions, all agents maximize subject to the same prices; in consequence, the e¤ects of heterogeneity are diminished.
Unemployment insurance, in the form of subsidies to the unemployed, operates through two opposing mechanisms in this framework. To the extent that it serves to complete markets, it reduces precautionary savings and increases both employed and unemployed agents' consumption. This insurance e¤ect of policy is associated with a positive e¤ect on welfare. However, in increasing the outside option of an employed worker, it raises wages and this has detrimental e¤ects on aggregate welfare. A higher unemployment subsidy increases average wages that in turn reduces the number of o¤ered vacancies, and consequently, employment. The capital-labor ratio is moderately a¤ected and aggregate capital decreases along with employment. This e¢ ciency e¤ect of policy has a negative e¤ect on welfare. Note that the insurance e¤ect of policy arises due to the presence of idiosyncratic risk, but the e¢ ciency e¤ect is independent of that risk. Hence, in an economy with idiosyncratic risk, the optimal level of unemployment insurance is higher than in an economy with perfect income insurance. In this regard, a model constructed under the assumption of complete private insurance would underestimate the positive e¤ects of this type of policy. This paper is related to an extensive literature that analyzes the macroeconomic implications of the existence of trading frictions in the labor market. 3 We follow Merz (1995 ), Andolfatto (1996 , and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) in embedding a search and matching model of the labor market, as presented in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , in a general equilibrium framework. Even though the central purposes of these models is the analysis of unemployment, they share the shortcoming of not taking into account the e¤ects of income risks on agents'optimal decisions, and through their aggregation, on macroeconomic conditions. To ensure tractability these models are forced to make the strong assumption that all agents are risk neutral, or that risk averse agents belong to extended households within which they obtain perfect insurance against income ‡uctuations, or alternatively, that there exist a complete set of …nancial instruments that allows them to perfectly insure against unemployment risk. In departing from these assumptions, our work relates to the literature on heterogeneity among agents resulting from the presence of uninsurable risk originated by Bewley (1977 Bewley ( , 1980 . A smaller literature has sought to analyze the e¤ects of unemployment insurance in models with risk aversion and incomplete markets. However, most of these papers have done so using di¤erent modeling of the labor market that lack the noncooperative wage setup that our model incorporates. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) use a model of directed search and wage posting to analyze the e¢ ciency of unemployment insurance; Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) use a model of search with rigid labor contracts to study the e¤ects of severance payments; Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) use a search model in which agents choose whether to work or not at the prevailing wage. Finally, Lentz (2005) uses a partial equilibrium model of search with savings and exogenous wages to empirically estimate the optimal level of unemployment insurance using Danish data.
To the best or our knowledge, Valdivia (1996) and Costain and Reiter (2004) are the only studies to use a model of search and matching, with non-cooperative wage determination and savings. However, a crucial di¤erence with our work is that they do not take into account the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk in the wage bargaining process. 4 Our …ndings indicate that this is an important mechanism that cannot be ignored in the presence of incomplete markets because heterogeneity a¤ects not only consumption smoothing, but also price determination.
Our methodology based on perturbation methods allows us to analyze the e¤ects of incomplete markets in wages. These methods go back to Kydland and Prescott (1982) for …rst order approximation, and they have been since developed by Judd (1998) , Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2003) , and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for representative agents models. Preston and Roca (2006) show how to apply this methodology to models with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. In the present paper, the latter approach is adapted to the particular characteristics of a model of matching in the labor market. A particular challenge to using perturbation methods, which rely on di¤erentiability, is the treatment of unemployment because it introduces a discrete state space.
In this paper, we show how to deal with this issue in developing and implementing a methodology that can also be applied to other types of models involving discrete state variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses the solution methodology. Section 4 performs a quantitative analysis to evaluate the e¤ects of incomplete markets on agents'optimal decision rules and aggregate conditions. It also determines optimal unemployment insurance in this framework. Section 5 concludes. Appendices explain the main derivations.
The Model
We use a general equilibrium model with ‡exible prices and perfect competition in the market for the homogeneous consumption good. This good is produced by the many …rms in the economy through the transformation of capital and labor supplied by consumers. These agents optimally allocate part of their income to buy the consumption good and save the rest in the form of physical capital -the only available means for transferring wealth across periods. While the rental market for capital is Walrasian, we assume that there are frictions in the labor market that makes it costly for …rms and workers to meet and form a successful match. Time is discrete, with period length given by .
avoid the dependence of wages on individual asset holdings.
Labor market
There is a constant labor force, normalized to one, and a fraction u t of its members are unemployed and looking for a job at period t. There is also a number v t of vacant jobs o¤ered by …rms wanting to increase their productive positions. During every time interval, some unemployed workers are randomly matched with some vacancies. The total number of matches is determined by the aggregate relation
This matching function is assumed to be increasing in each of its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. Using these properties, the fraction of vacancies that are …lled in each interval, the "job-…lling rate," is given by
Similarly, the fraction of unemployed workers that are matched with a vacancy in each interval, the "job-…nding rate," is given by
By the properties of the matching function, q is decreasing, and p increasing, in the vacancyunemployment ratio. This implies that a market with relatively higher vacancies makes it more di¢ cult for …rms to …ll a position, and consequently, easier for an unemployed worker to be hired.
Similarly, a market with relatively more unemployment makes it more di¢ cult for a worker to form a match with a …rm. In other words, unemployed agents face higher negative search externalities as the number of agents looking for a job increases, but they face lower externalities as the number of posted vacancies rises. The opposite is true for …rms seeking to …ll vacancies.
Every period, some agents become unemployed because a fraction of productive jobs are severed for exogenous reasons. Together with the matching function, this ‡ow of agents into the unemployment pool explains the existence of equilibrium unemployment. Consequently, in our framework variations in the unemployment rate are explained by …rm's job creation decisions rather than by any variations in the rate of job destruction.
Matches and separations occur at the end of each time interval. The net change in jobs then determine the number of workers available for production at the beginning of the following interval.
Under these assumptions, the law of motion of the unemployment rate is characterized by
Consumers
There is a continuum of in…nitely lived consumer-workers indexed by i 2 I = [0; 1], that maximize the present value of the expected sum of intertemporal utilities, discounted at rate . Risk averse agents derive utility from consumption of the homogenous good; this is represented by an increasing, strictly concave felicity function U (:). To smooth consumption over time, agents accumulate assets in the form of physical capital, that is rented to …rms at an endogenous rate r t in a perfectly competitive market, and depreciates at an exogenous rate . These individual holdings of capital stock are represented by a i t . In addition, agents'optimal saving decisions are subject to the constraint that individual asset holdings can not fall below an exogenous borrowing limitã 0. 5
Employment status a¤ects the income that agents receive in each period. A subset of agents,
i 2 E I, are employed in any given period. They receive a compensation for their labor of w i t determined through individual bargaining, and face probability of becoming unemployed in the following period. The model of wage bargain developed below implies that w i t = w(a i t ), that is, wages are consumer speci…c through their dependence in the consumer's wealth a i t .
The remainder of agents, i 2 I E, are unemployed. They receive unemployment insurance in the form or monetary compensation b t , and face probability p of becoming employed. Additionally, all consumers receive an equal share t of …rms'pro…ts, and pay lump-sum taxes t .
We can express the maximization problem of each type of agent in terms of a Bellman equation.
Denoting by W e (a i t ; t) the value function of an employed worker with assets a i t at beginning of period 
where
is the rate of asset accumulation per unit of time, and c e t is the consumption rate per unit of time.
Equation (5) shows that employed agents optimally choose consumption to maximize intertemporal per-period utility U (:) , given their current accumulated wealth a i t . The expected next period continuation value is determined by the probability of changing employment status, and by next period accumulated wealth. This is the result of adding per-period savings _ a e t to current wealth.
Condition (6) imposes the borrowing limit.
Similarly, by letting W u (a i t ; t) be the value function of an unemployed agent that is searching for a job and has accumulated level of assets a i t , we have
is the rate of asset accumulation, and c u t represents the consumption rate per unit of time.
For later use, note that the …rst order conditions for optimality for employed agents are given by
with equality if a i t + _ a e (a i t ) >ã; where subscripts indicate a derivative with respect to that variable.
Similarly, the …rst order conditions for unemployed agents are given by
with equality if
These conditions state that agents attempt to smooth consumption across intervals gauging the marginal utility of current consumption against its opportunity cost. They have the interpretation of standard stochastic Euler equations. The …rst term on the right hand side represents the discounted expected marginal utility of future consumption. The second term emerges because of the assumed form of wage bargaining. It states that assets not only provide a return in the rental market, but since they provide self-insurance in the event of job loss, they can also potentially in ‡uence the outcome of the wage bargaining, and consequently have an e¤ect on future labor earnings. 6
Firms
There is a continuum of large …rms indexed by j 2 J = [0; 1], that seek to maximize an expected discounted sum of current and future pro…ts. Firms sell to consumers a homogenous good produced using labor, n j , and capital, k j . The production function F (:) is increasing in each input, concave, homogeneous of degree one, and satis…es the Inada conditions.
To hire employees, the …rm posts v j vacancies at a unit cost . These vacancies are matched with an unemployed agent and become a productive job during the following interval with probability q.
Additionally, during each interval, some jobs will be destroyed with probability . At the beginning of each interval, after a match has been formed, but before production starts, the …rm negotiates with each worker a salary that will be speci…c to that position. The average salary paid by the …rm is w j .
Denoting by (:) the value function of the …rm, its maximization problem can be represented as (n j t ; t) = max
subject to
where Q t;t+ is the stochastic discount factor used by the …rm to price future pro…ts. Since we assume, for simplicity, that consumers own an equal part of each …rm, and receive a common share of pro…ts, 7
we assume that the …rm uses average marginal utilities to value future pro…ts
Note that this assumption is of little relevance in a stationary equilibrium like the one we are solving for. In this case, the discount factor is just determined by the discount rate and the length of the time interval because the bracketed expression always equals one. 8
The …rst order conditions for optimality of …rm j are given by
and
The …rst condition is the usual optimality condition under perfect competition and states that …rms hire capital until they equate its marginal product with the economy wide rental rate. The second condition states that …rms post vacancies to equate their average cost per interval -given by the …xed ‡ow cost multiplied by the expected duration of a vacancy -with the expected bene…t of hiring additional workers. This is the usual condition that …rms post vacancies until their contribution to pro…ts is driven to zero.
Finally, since …rms are homogeneous, to simplify the notation we drop the superscript j from these optimality conditions and from now on use the conditions for a representative …rm.
7 This assumption rules out the existence of a market for equities. This is not restrictive because if such a market did exist, by an arbitrage condition the return on …rm's equity would equate the return on physical capital in equilibrium. As a consequence, consumers would be indi¤erent between portfolios composed of di¤erent proportions of the two assets. In our case, …rm ownership is …xed and agents adjust the proportion of the assets they hold in their portfolios by varying their holdings of physical capital. 8 We include this general treatment because in the presence of aggregate shocks or if we wish to analyze the transition dynamics resulting from a policy change, that simpli…cation would not be possible. We present the general case to allow a complete statement of the model equations before de…ning the stationary equilibrium.
Wage determination
Due to the existence of search costs, any job has an associated rent that is divided between worker and …rm through a negotiated wage. Since each agent would like to maximize his share of that surplus, they bargain over the wage. The negotiation takes place at the beginning of the following period after a match has been formed, but before production starts. The wage is renegotiated every period while the worker is employed at the …rm. 9 Following Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), the bargaining is described by an strategic model with exogenous risk of breakdown. According to this bargaining protocol each agent alternates in making an o¤er that could be accepted or rejected by the other agent. In the latter case, there exists an exogenous probability that the bargain falls through, and the match is dissolved. This risk of breakdown acts as an incentive for agents to reach an agreement. 10 Let w be the probability that the bargain fails if the worker's o¤er is rejected, and f be the corresponding probability in the case that the …rm's o¤er is rejected.
From the envelope condition to problem (13) the …rm's valuation of an additional worker who receives a wage w i t is given by
This condition states that the …rm values the worker for her current and future marginal contributions to output. The last term indicates that with probability 1 the position will remain occupied the following period and the …rm will obtain its discounted expected value, equal to the average cost of posting vacancies, by condition (17).
The valuation of the job by the worker is determined by the di¤erence in the value functions across di¤erent employment states
This valuation of the job depends on the negotiated wage and the unemployment compensation. 11
9 Since individual and aggregate conditions changes every period, this assumption prevents the introduction of commitment issues that could potentially be interesting in this setting but go beyond the scope of this paper.
1 0 Note that there is no time involved in the bargain process and consequently there is no possibility of delays. In a bargaining that extends over time, the impatience of the agents for the desired outcomes acts as an incentive to reach an agreement. This is important because in this model the outside options of the agents in the bargain change over time and consequently the solution could be a¤ected if time was considered. Coles and Wright (1998) analyze dynamic bargaining in a non-stationary environment.
1 1 We make explicit the dependence of the value function on the negotiated wage since we are solving the wage In appendix A.1. we show that the solution to the bargaining is given by
Since the right hand side is monotonically increasing in wages but the left hand side is monotonically decreasing, there exists a unique solution for the individual wage w i = w(a i ) for a given exogenous bargaining power and aggregate conditions. The solution states that the parties divide the total surplus generated by the occupied position according to the relative bargaining power w f
. 12
There are two central aspects of this solution. First, the valuation of the job by the worker depends not only on the negotiated wage but also on her accumulated wealth since her ability to smooth consumption depends on these assets under incomplete insurance. The higher the amount of wealth, the lower would be the di¤erence in consumption between the two employment states and the lower would the valuation of the job by the worker. Second, this valuation is expressed in units of current consumption by normalizing it by her marginal utility of consumption. This determines the e¤ect in the bargain of risk aversion. Note that under linear preferences that divisor would just equal one.
Finally, the average wage paid by the representative …rm is given by
This completes the description of the labor market.
Government
The government follows a balanced budget policy in each time interval collecting lump-sum taxes from consumers and providing unemployment insurance. We consider an unemployment insurance scheme in which unemployed agents receive a constant replacement ratio of the average wage in the economy. Hence, we have the additional constraints
function for any level of individual assets. 1 2 As can be expected, the solution is consistent with the Nash axioms for a solution to a non-cooperative bargaining; we make explicit the bargain protocol because valuations are not transferable under risk aversion and to explain the determination of the relative bargaining power.
This completes the description of the model.
Stationary Equilibrium
To de…ne a stationary equilibrium we consider invariant measures over individual asset levels e and u for the fraction of the population that is respectively employed and unemployed. To characterize these measures we introduce the inverse mappings e (a) and u (a), which determine today's asset holdings as a function of tomorrow's, and de…ned using the asset accumulation equations as
The condition for e and u to be invariant measures for any interval (a 1 ; a 2 ) are
where e ((a 1 ; a 2 )) and u ((a 1 ; a 2 )) are the fractions of the population consisting respectively of employed and unemployed persons with asset holdings between a 1 and a 2 . The …rst condition states that the measure of workers that keep their jobs plus the measure of unemployed agents that are matched must be equal to the measure of employed in the following interval; the second, states a similar relation for unemployed agents.
De…nition
A stationary equilibrium consists of:
-constant values for r; w; ; ; b; k; n; u; v; q; p;
-measures e and u , de…ned on the Borel sets of some compact interval of asset values A; and -policy functions c e (a), c u (a), _ a e (a), _ a u (a), value functions W e (a), W u (a), and a wage function w(a) de…ned for all a 2 A; such that 1. the policy functions _ a e and _ a u imply that for any a 2 A, a + _ a e (a), a + _ a u (a) 2 A, as well;
2. given the constant values r; ; and the time invariant wage function w(a), the policy functions c e (a) and _ a e (a) are time-invariant solutions to problem (5), and W e (a) is the associated value function;
3. given the constant values r; ; , b the policy functions c u (a) and _ a u (a) are time-invariant solutions to problem (8), and W u (a) is the associated value function;
4. given the policy functions _ a e and _ a u the inverse mappings e (a) and u (a) satisfy (24) and (25) for each a 2 A;
5. given the constant values q; r; w and discount factor Q = e each period, and given an initial labor force n, the solution to problem (13) involves constant values k; v; n each period;
6. for each a 2 A, w(a) solves (20); 7. the values of v; u; p; q satisfy (2) and (3); 8. the values of n; u; p satisfy
which is the stationary version of (4);
9. the values of w; ; b; u; satisfy (22) and (23); 10. the values of ; r; w; k; n; v; satisfy
11. given the wage function w(a) and the invariant measure e , the average wage w satis…es (21); 12. given the invariant measures e and u the constant value of k satis…es
and 13. the invariant measures e and u satisfy (26) and (27).
To analyze the behavior of this economy, we must obtain a solution for the equilibrium conditions explained above. This is a di¢ cult task because of the wealth distribution that emerges due to agents being subject to di¤erent employment histories in the absence of complete insurance. Preston and Roca (2006) show how to apply perturbation methods to characterize state dependent agents'optimal decision rules in the presence of continuously distributed idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks that engender a dynamic wealth distribution. The key conceptual issue is that the aggregate constraint (30) imposes restrictions on the computation of the elasticities of individual decisions functions. In other words, the aggregation of the individual decision rules must be consistent with the aggregate conditions of the economy.
The main idea behind perturbation methods is to …rst solve the model for a particular case that has a simple, known solution. Given the information provided by that solution we then …nd an approximation to the more complex general solution to the problem of interest. For instance, when this methodology is applied to problems with aggregate uncertainty, the solution consists in a perturbation around the non-stochastic steady state. In the present model, we obtain an approximation around the fast-turnover limit obtained when the length of the time interval is made in…nitively small. As we explain in detail below, heterogeneity vanishes in that limit and we are able to compute a solution using the usual methods for representative agent models. Then we perturb the equilibrium conditions for a positive time interval to approximate the solution to the model with heterogeneous agents.
The utilization of this approach has several advantages. First, from the determination of analytical optimal decision rules we will be able to identify how intrinsic characteristics of heterogeneous agents -such as employment status or accumulated wealth -diversely a¤ect agents' behavior, and through aggregation, the macroeconomy. Second, in contrast to other purely numerical procedures that must resort to simulations to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent policies, we will be able to obtain a measure of individual welfare that explicitly takes into consideration both the aggregate and distributional e¤ects of policy.
We adapt the methodology presented in Preston and Roca (2006) to our speci…c problem of in-terest. That paper models idiosyncratic risk as a shock that follows a continuous stochastic process.
That treatment is suitable for the use of perturbation methods because they rely on di¤erentiability of the equilibrium conditions with respect to the state variables. In the present paper we face the complication that the idiosyncratic employment risk is a discrete variable, agents can be either employed or unemployed, creating a complication for the use of those methods. Another complication related to the necessary di¤erentiability of the equilibrium conditions, which is already discussed in Preston and Roca (2006) , is derived from the presence of inequalities constraints like (6) and (9). Finally, the restrictions that aggregate conditions impose on the coe¢ cients of the individual decision functions need to be made explicit. The following sections explain in detail how we deal with these issues.
Borrowing Constraints
Since the optimality conditions for the model involve the complementary slackness conditions (11), and (12), the Euler equations do not hold with equality when the borrowing constraints binds. This presents a di¢ culty for perturbation methods which require model equations to be di¤erentiable, at least to a degree commensurate with the degree of accuracy of the approximation.
To accommodate this requirement we make use of a long literature in the linear programming and non-linear optimization …elds of applied mathematics on interior methods for optimization problems subject to inequality constraints -see Forsgren, Gill, and Wright (2002) for a review and detailed references therein. The idea is to replace the problems of maximizing the objective functions (5) and (8) subject to the inequality constraints (6) and (9) with unconstrained maximization problems. This is achieved by de…ning a composite function that re ‡ects the properties of the unconstrained objective functions and the constraints.
To this end, de…ne the interior function
whereã is the borrowing limit, and > 0. This function has the property that as individual asset holdings approach the borrowing constraintã the interior function approaches in…nity. Now 
It has the property that for small " > 0 the maximization problem behaves like the unconstrained maximization of (5). When a i t + a e t (a i ) approachesã the interior function tends to dominate the value function W e (a i t ; t) leading to large negative values. The composite function therefore penalizes consumption-savings decisions that lead to an asset position near the borrowing limit. Importantly, the unconstrained problem retains all relevant di¤erentiability properties of the original problem.
Similarly, we modify the Bellman equation of the unemployed agent to obtain
Forsgren, Gill, and Wright (2002) provide theorems under which the maximand of the composite function converge to the maximand of the original problem as " ! 0. Moreover, bounds can be determined on the magnitude of the error in the maximand obtained from the modi…ed problem with small ". We shall not develop the theory of interior methods further since we intend to take an approximation to this modi…ed problem. However, note that interior methods are very close in spirit to penalty functions used to solve the original Bellman equation when using numerical methods and value function iteration. Penalty functions heavily penalize the value function for decisions that violate the borrowing constraint. Hence, at this stage we have not departed in an important way from the recent approaches to solving this class of model -for example Krusell and Smith (1998) . The important departure is the use of perturbation methods which requires an explicit statement of the adopted penalty or barrier function. 13 1 3 Such penalty functions appear in various literatures. In related work Kim, Kim, and Kollmann (2005) directly introduce a penalty term in the utility function to enforce the same kind of borrowing constraint. An alternative approach is to introduce quadratic costs to adjusting capital holdings of the form " (a ã) 2 . As asset holdings approach the borrowing limitã the cost tends to in…nity. The interpretation is that individuals that are close to their borrowing limit, therefore representing "bad credit risks," must expend greater resources to secure loans. Hence in equilibrium agents will never choose a sequence of consumption that lead to (6) or (9) holding with equality. This approach is similar to the recent literature on small open economy macroeconomic models which has adopted debt sensitive interest rate premia to ensure stationarity of foreign debt holdings in equilibrium -see Benigno (2001) , Kollmann (2002) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) . This approach gives similar results to those we report for the interior method.
Fast-turnover limit
To characterize the equilibrium around which we approximate the solution to the economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, we proceed in two steps. The …rst step, described in this section, considers the limit when all agents are changing employment states in…nitely fast and the wealth distribution becomes degenerate at the aggregate level of capital. In the next section, we describe the steady state as a special case of the former in which individual and aggregate wealth remain constant.
Consider an interval of size . During this interval, an endogenous fraction p of unemployed agents form a match with a vacancy posted by the representative …rm, and an exogenous fraction of workers losses their work. We can de…ne the turnover rates between employment status as p and respectively. These rates indicate the speed at which agents are changing employment status. As we shrink the size of the time interval , the turnover rates increase, producing a decline in the mean duration that agents spend in each state. In the limit when ! 0, agents change status in…nitely fast.
In this fast-turnover limit, agents receive the same average income from labor and accumulate equal amounts of wealth per unit of time. Thus, their consumption and saving decisions are alike. It is worth noting that this case is consistent with the commonly used assumption, after Merz (1995) , that individuals belong to extended households in which they pool their income. An important di¤erence is that in our model agents become homogeneous only in the limit, and further, we are able to analyze their behavior outside the limit when heterogeneity becomes important. It is this device that permits one to treat employment and unemployment as discrete states yet still apply perturbation methods that rely on di¤erentiability.
An important aspect of our modeling is that unemployment and vacancies are endogenously determined in a general equilibrium model according to agents'optimizing decisions. As such, they are in ‡uenced not only by other endogenous variables but also by the length of the time interval under consideration. Consequently, the endogenous rates q and p are also dependent on the length of the time interval, but only through to the operation of the general equilibrium model. 14 In this respect, our model di¤ers from the standard Mortensen and Pissarides model. In their model, the transition probabilities follow a Poisson process that implies-using similar notation for ease of comparison-that the number of matches in any given interval of size is given by m , and that the job-…lling, job-…nding and job destruction rates are respectively given by q , p , and
. All of these rates approach zero per period as the period length is made increasingly small, though there remains a non-zero (and well-de…ned) rate per unit of time. In our model, instead, the rates approach a positive limit as approaches zero.
In appendix A.2. we show that taking the limit ! 0 to the …rst order conditions of (32) and (33), 15 the consumers optimality conditions can be expressed as
is the common rate of asset accumulation. Note that these are similar to the standard conditions that would be obtained in a representative agent model subject to the same borrowing constraint. This is the expected result since agents in this state are homogeneous and do not face any income risk. In this limit, it is therefore a deterministic model.
To solve for the steady state wage we use the bargaining solution (20). In appendix A.2.2. we show that taking the limit ! 0 to the di¤erence in the value functions (32), and (33), and to the valuation of the job by the …rm (18) we obtain the following wage function
This relation is similar to the one obtained under the assumption of complete insurance against labor income risk or linear preferences, and consequently is independent of individual wealth. It states that the wage is a linear combination between the two extremes of the bargaining range with a weight given by the exogenous bargaining power of the two agents. When the worker has no relative power ( w f ! 0) the …rm appropriates the whole surplus of the job by paying the minimum probabilities we should write p( ) and q( ) but for clarity in the exposition we do not show explicitly that dependence.
wage possible, the one that equates the unemployment subsidy. On the other extreme, when the relative bargaining power of the …rm is nil ( w f ! 1), the worker gets all the surplus by negotiating a wage that equates the marginal product of labor plus the savings in posting vacancies.
From the analysis of the conditions characterizing the fast-turnover limit we can observe the limited in ‡uence of unemployment under the prevailing assumption of complete insurance. In that case, welfare of employed and unemployed agents is the same, and correspond to the predictions of the model assuming a representative household. The only departure from a model with competitive labor markets is that labor income is di¤erent from the marginal product of labor due to the presence of search frictions.
Steady state
In steady state, individual and aggregate capital are equal and constant, implying that all endogenous variables are also constant. Under the additional condition _ a( a) = 0, conditions (34) and (35) become
From these conditions together with (2), (3), (16), (17), (22), (23), (28), (29), (30), and (36) we solve for the steady state values c, a, q, p, r, v, , b, u, n, , k, and w.
Approximation
Our objective is to obtain a linear approximation to the decision functions around the described steady state. A departing point is the value of those functions at that steady state computed in the previous section. Then we determine the behavior of these functions around that expansion point by computing the derivatives of the equilibrium conditions with respect to the state variable a and the length of the time interval . These derivatives form a system of equations. The solution to this system gives the desired coe¢ cients determining the behavior of the functions around the steady state. Hence, this is just the usual …rst order approximation solution to a system of di¤erential equations. What is innovative is that we take the approximation with respect to the size of the time interval; from the methodological point of view this is treated as another state variable.
Consider for instance the function describing the consumption of the employed agent. We want to obtain a …rst order approximation to that function around the steady state (a; ) = ( a; 0) of the following form
That is, the approximate value that the function c e (a; ) takes around its steady state value c = c e ( a; 0) depends on the deviation of individual assets from their steady state level and the exposure to uninsurable risk, measured by . The coe¢ cients c a and c e quantify these responses.
An interesting feature of our methodology is that we can identify the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk with the last term in equation (39); without considering this term the approximation would correspond to the one obtained under the complete insurance assumption.
Aggregate conditions and stationary distribution
When dealing with heterogeneous agent models it is important to explicitly consider the restrictions given by aggregate conditions in order to ensure consistency with the individual decision functions.
Since our objective is to obtain a linear approximation, we only need to impose that consistency between the linearized aggregate conditions and the linear approximation to the individual decision rules. In this case, the analysis of these relations will also shed light about the dependence of the distribution on the length of the time interval :
Consider the linear approximation to the functions characterizing the rate of asset accumulation of employed and unemployed agents
where a e and a u are de…ned by _ a e ( a e ) = 0; and _ a u ( a u ) = 0; or using (7) and (10) a e = w + c e r ; and a u = b + c u r :
Conditions (26), and (27) can be expressed in terms of the corresponding (normalized) density functions f e and f u
Noting from (24) and (25) that e 0 (a) = 1 1 + a e a ( e (a))
; and
; the previous conditions can be expressed as
Next, by replacing the rate of asset accumulation by their approximations given by (40) and (41), and appropriately reordering we get
where k e and k u are the average asset holdings of employed and unemployed agents respectively. 
Finally, the aggregate level of capital is given by
These conditions characterize the wealth distribution in a …rst order approximation. We replace equilibrium condition (30) with these linear restrictions in order to obtain our approximate solution.
It is worth noting how the distribution depends on the length of the time interval, the mechanism that permits the application of our methodology. From (42), and (43) we observe that when ! 0, the mean asset level held by the employed agents k e approximates that of the unemployed k u , and consequently both values approximates the aggregate asset level. In other words, the distribution becomes degenerate. For positive values of , these mean asset levels held by each type of agent diverge and the distribution becomes nondegenerate. Moreover, for a given , it is also stationary.
Quantitative analysis
While this type of approximation could be performed analytically, we proceed to work with a calibrated version of the model to obtain easily interpretable coe¢ cients.
Calibration
We consider a time period of one month. Preferences are of the CRRA type
with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion set to 2. The consumers'discount rate is set to 0.3356% per month, implying a quarterly discount factor of 0.99.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas
with share of capital set equal to 0.36. The constant z is used to normalize wages to one in steady state. We consider an annual depreciation rate of capital of 10% or equivalently 0.83% per month.
The parameter of the barrier function (31) is set to 2, while " is 0.1, and the borrowing limit a is set to 0 implying that agents cannot borrow.
Regarding the parameters characterizing the labor market, we calibrate the job destruction rate to 0.034 per period. This value implies that when = 1 jobs last on average thirty months, consistent with the empirical evidence for the U.S. presented on Shimer (2005) . The matching function m(u; v) is implicitly de…ned by the equation
Note that this speci…cation reduces to the commonly used Cobb-Douglas as A is made in…nitely small. As such, it retains its main properties, like linear homogeneity. However, it has the advantage that the job-…nding and the job-…lling rates originated by this function are always contained in the unit interval. This must always hold since the number of matches cannot be larger than the number of unemployed agents or the number of vacancies. In a discrete time setting like ours, the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation does not assure that these rates remain in the unit interval. For a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) reports that a suitable value for lies between 0.5 and 0.7. We set equal to 0.5.
We initially follow Shimer (2005) and set the replacement ratio to 40%, that is considered to be an upper bound for the U.S.; O.E.C.D. (2006) reports that the average replacement rate for the U.S. is 36%. Later, we investigate the e¤ects of varying levels of this policy instrument and determine its optimal level in this economy.
Since a priori, there is not indication about what could be an appropriate level of the relative bargaining power of the …rm and workers, we give the same bargaining strength to each party, setting w f equal to one.
Finally we calibrate the ‡ow cost of posting vacancies and the matching function constant
A to target the job-…nding rate of 0.45 per month estimated by Shimer (2005) . Since in this model, we are free to set the value of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, 16 we target a value of 1. Together with the desired job-…nding rate, this pins down the constant of the matching function to 0.8181, and implies that the job-…lling rate equals the job-…nding rate in steady state. Then, using these values in the optimizing condition of the …rm (17), we pin down the ‡ow cost of posting vacancies to be equal to 0.2699. This value represents approximately one fourth of steady state monthly wages.
The e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of introducing idiosyncratic risk on aggregate conditions and individual optimal decisions. In Table 1 we present the e¤ects on some variables directly related to the labor market. We compare the values of those variables in the fast-turnover limit, that is for the limit in which approaches 0, and in a …rst-order approximation to an equilibrium with a small positive value of . The positive-case that we consider is one in which equals one month. Giver our other parameters, this case corresponds to roughly the rate of ‡ows in and out of unemployment in the U.S.
The last rows of Table 1 are useful to illustrate our method. In there we present the di¤erent values of the job-…nding and job-…lling rates under these two assumptions In the fast-turnover limit, while the per period rates have a …nite positive value equal to 0.45, the rates per month are in…nite and consequently the mean duration of each state goes to zero. When we introduce positive delay, the rates per unit of time become …nite, and consequently the mean duration becomes positive.
When = 1 the rate per period equals the rate per month at an endogenously determined value.
Note that the resulting job-…nding rate is still close to our target value of 0.45.
The introduction of incomplete markets primarily a¤ects the outcome of the wage bargaining because it changes the outside option that workers would experience in case they do not arrive to an agreement with the …rm. This is re ‡ected in a change in the worker's valuation of the job that will be speci…c to each agent because her asset holdings determine her capacity of smoothing consumption between employment states. The average valuation increases in going from the fast-turnover limit to the new equilibrium with idiosyncratic risk producing an increment in the total surplus of the match. This additional surplus is divided according to the exogenous relative bargaining power through a reduction in wages. In Table 1 we observe that average wages decline by 0.01%. The higher surplus obtained by …rms gives them incentives to post more vacancies, that in turn increases the number of employed agents. As a consequence, the trading externalities for unemployed agents decrease, and the trading externalities for …rms increase. In Table 1 we observe that the job-…nding rate increases by 0.51% and the job-…lling rate decreases by the same percentage.
We can analyze the e¤ects of incomplete markets on agent behavior from the approximation to the individual decision functions. Figure 1 presents consumption pro…les with di¤erent exposure to uninsurable risk and di¤erent employment status. We observe that in the fast-turnover limit, in which there is no e¤ect of idiosyncratic risk, all agents share the same consumption function that is positively correlated with variations in individual wealth. As can be expected in this case, the aggregate consumption function coincides with the individual ones. The introduction of idiosyncratic risk generates a decline in the consumption pro…le of unemployed agents but an increase in that of employed agents. This re ‡ects the fact that in the presence of incomplete markets agents are unable to perfectly smooth their consumption across the di¤erent employment states.
It is also qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Gruber (1997) , who
shows that consumption declines upon becoming unemployed. Moreover, taking the unconditional expectation of those consumption functions we obtain a consumption pro…le that lies below that of the fast-turnover limit. In other words, on average, consumption is reduced at any wealth level because of the presence of uninsurable risk. Table 2 we present the general equilibrium e¤ects generated by the introduction of incomplete insurance. We observe that the average consumption of employed agents increases by 0.02% in comparison with the fast-turnover limit benchmark, but the average consumption of the unemployed population decreases by 1.13%. The latter pulls down the aggregate consumption of the whole population that decreases by 0.06%.
The e¤ect of incomplete markets is particularly noticeable in the saving decision. We observe that the average wealth of unemployed agents is reduced by 4.36%. In contrast, the average wealth of employed agents increases by 0.37%. The aggregation of these e¤ects produce an increase in total wealth of 0.04%. This is due to two di¤erent mechanisms. One is that each consumer expends more time in each employment state and consequently this is translated to di¤erences in the accumulated level of assets. The second is the usual precautionary motive to save. Employed agents increase their savings so when they become unemployed they can adjust the level of assets in order to smooth consumption between employment states. 
Optimal replacement rate
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of unemployment insurance on welfare in order to determine the optimal level of the replacement rate . Our objective is to consider in particular how that optimal level is a¤ected by the presence of incomplete markets. 17
To evaluate policy changes we use the following social welfare criterion
where W e (a), and W u (a) are the value functions (5), and (8). 18 We solve the model for di¤erent values of the replacement rate and compare the value attained by (49). The optimal policy rate is determined by the value that maximizes this criterion. Additionally, to have a sense of the magnitude of the welfare changes associated with variations in policy we express the welfare gains in terms of percentage changes in consumption using as a benchmark the value obtained under our baseline calibration with = 0:40. Figure 2 presents these welfare gains for the fast-turnover limit and for the economy with idiosyncratic risk. In the case of the fast-turnover limit the welfare gains are maximized for a replacement rate of 0%, that is, any positive level of unemployment insurance is detrimental to welfare. In contrast, with idiosyncratic risk the optimal replacement rate is positive and it equals 30%. In this framework, unemployment insurance has a direct e¤ect on wages. In altering the income that an agent receives while unemployed, it a¤ects the outside option for a current employee and consequently it in ‡uences the outcome of the wage bargaining. Figure 3 presents the general equilibrium e¤ects on di¤erent endogenous variables of varying levels of the replacement rate in the fast-turnover limit. We observe that a higher replacement rate induces higher wages since it increases the worker's threat point in the bargain. This reduces the …rms' valuation of a …lled position, and consequently they reduce the number of posted vacancies. This has negative consequences on employment producing an increment in the unemployment rate. The reduction in labor pressures for a decline in the return on capital, and ultimately reduces the stock of aggregate capital. This can be explained by the low response of the interest rate to changes of policy. We observe that the wedge between the discount rate and the net interest rate r + = 0:03%, remains practically unaltered. This implies that the capital-labor ratio also su¤ers little modi…cation and consequently aggregate capital must adjust to changes in labor. Overall, the reduction in the inputs of production generates a decline in output, and in consumption.
Hence, we observe that the lowest level possible of unemployment insurance is desired in the fast-turnover limit because any positive level is ine¢ cient due to the in ‡uence that it exerts in the wage bargaining. It is important to remark that the analysis of the general equilibrium e¤ects is crucial in this analysis, in a partial equilibrium model that takes as given the marginal product of labor the e¤ects of the wage bargain on aggregate capital would be missed and consequently such an analysis could lead to erroneous evaluation of the insurance policy. The introduction of idiosyncratic risk into the analysis produces the same qualitative e¤ects on endogenous variables as those presented in tables 1 and 2. The di¤erent levels of the replacement rate only modify their relative magnitude. Figure 4 shows the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk on individual decision functions and, throw their aggregation, on aggregate conditions for di¤erent levels of the replacement rate. All e¤ects are measure as percentage of the correspoding steady state values. In panel A we observe that the consumption pro…le of unemployed agents is reduced by the presence of the uninsurable risk, but also that such e¤ect is inversely related to the magnitude of the replacement rate. Panel B shows that the average consumption of the unemployed population is a¤ected in the same way. This implies that the insurance policy e¤ectively helps to complete the market even when the general equilibrium e¤ects are taken into account. As a consequence agents have less incentive to save because of precautionary motives and the reduction in consumption relative to that of the fast turnover limit is diminished. It is important to note the usefulness of our methodology in this analysis, as it permits us to isolate the variation in consumption due to di¤erent levels of idiosyncratic risk from the variation in consumption due to general equilibrium e¤ects discussed above. With other numerical methods, disentangling these two e¤ects would not be immediate.
This positive e¤ect of policy in consumption is also translated to a positive e¤ect on welfare. The optimal level of the replacement rate under incomplete markets balances the trade-o¤ between the (negative) e¢ ciency e¤ects and the (positive) insurance e¤ects of policy. Since the latter e¤ect is not present under the complete insurance assumption the optimal level of the replacement rate under incomplete markets will always be as least as high as the obtained under the …rst assumption, and will generally be higher. In other words, the assumption of complete markets underestimates the positive e¤ects of unemployment insurance and hence leads to misleading policy recommendations for an economy with incomplete markets.
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the importance of incomplete insurance in a general equilibrium model with search frictions in the labor market and ex-post bargaining over the rents created by a match.
We show that policy recommendations are markedly di¤erent when the e¤ects of idiosyncratic income risk are taken into account. For a calibration of the model to the U.S. economy, we …nd that the optimal level of the replacement ratio is about 30%. In contrast, under the assumption of complete income insurance, the model would not justify a positive replacement ratio.
Our model can also explain the existence of a decline in consumption upon becoming unemployed that has been documented in the empirical literature. Employed agents in this model save due to their precautionary motives. We …nd that employed agents continuously increase their accumulated wealth and as a consequence they have a better threat point in the bargaining over time. In contrast, unemployed agents run down their savings to bu¤er consumption from the income shock. As other theoretical works analyzing the importance of incomplete markets, 19 our qualitative results are consistent with empirical …ndings but the magnitude of those results seems to be relatively small. This is originated in the fact that agents in our model can get considerable self-insurance against income ‡uctuations by moderately increasing their savings. This could indi-cate that the magnitude and/or the persistence of the idiosyncratic risk in our model fall short of those observed in reality. Moreover, the assumption of ex-ante homogeneity in conjunction with an in…nite horizon reduces the e¤ect of that risk. If agents were ex-ante heterogeneous and they faced di¤erent risks due to this heterogeneity, both the persistence and magnitude of those risks could be increased. If they faced a …nite horizon, their decisions would be more pronounced in order to spread a given income shock in a shorter horizon. In summary, the fact that our quantitative results are relatively small but our qualitative results are consistent with observable facts indicates that the modeled economy is not risky enough, or that markets are still too close to completion, and not that a model constructed under the assumptions of complete markets and/or linear utility could be a good approximation. As we have demonstrated, the policy recommendation derived from such a model could be markedly di¤erent.
Another contribution of this paper is the proposed methodology to solve heterogeneous-agent models with a discrete state variable such as unemployment through the consideration of a fastturnover limit. This methodology has several advantages. First, it allows us to analytically characterize the responses of individual decision functions and aggregate conditions to changes in the states of the model. Second, our approach permits the isolation of the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk and consequently allows us to easily evaluate the e¤ects of incomplete markets in this framework.
Third, we have focused on the analysis of idiosyncratic risk in a stationary environment, but the model and the methodology that we have used can easily incorporate aggregate shocks to analyze the business cycle. In such a model, it would natural to also analyze the response of wages with respect to the economy-wide shock under the additional frictions generated by wealth heterogeneity in the wage bargaining. Additionally, one could easily analyze the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock. This also allows the consideration of the transition dynamics originated from changes in policy in the welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance policies.
We have restricted our analysis to a constant unemployment insurance policy. Under this policy, unemployed workers receive the same subsidy regardless of their wealth or the duration of an unemployment spell. In future research, it would be worth investigating the more general problem of optimal insurance without restriction to this particular class of policies.
The object of this paper has been to analyze the e¤ects of relaxing the strong assumption of complete insurance in a model that shares the main features of the commonly used Mortensen- Pissarides search and matching model with noncooperative wage determination. We have not attempted to analyze other possible labor contracts that might be preferable in this framework.
Since our model includes incomplete markets and risk-averse workers, an employment contract between the …rm and the worker could well be mutually bene…cial and superior in terms of e¢ ciency.
The aim of the present paper is simply to investigate the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk on the most commonly used model of wage bargaining and determine how these would in ‡uence the aggregate equilibrium. The analysis of optimal labor contracts in such a setting is undoubtedly a topic for future research.
For the purposes of this paper it has also su¢ ced to assume the existence of incomplete markets without inquiring into the causes that could lead to them. Future research will investigate how incomplete insurance can arise endogenously. Some possible causes for incompleteness could be the existence of limited enforcement or private information. Considering only terms of order , and using the envelope conditions F n (k t ; n t ) + (1 ) q t ;
this is equation (36) in the text.
From this condition we observe that the wage solution does not depend on individual assets in the fast-turnover limit. This is consistent with the individuals not being exposed to idiosyncratic risk in this limit. Hence, we have that w a (a i t ) = 0, and conditions (54) and (55) these are equations (34) and (35) in the text.
